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Abstract
We provide several applications of Optimistic Mirror Descent, an online learning algorithm based on the idea
of predictable sequences. First, we recover theMirror Prox algorithm for offline optimization, prove an extension
to Hölder-smooth functions, and apply the results to saddle-point type problems. Next, we prove that a version
of Optimistic Mirror Descent (which has a close relation to the Exponential Weights algorithm) can be used by
two strongly-uncoupled players in a finite zero-summatrix game to converge to the minimax equilibrium at the
rate ofO((logT )/T ). This addresses a question of Daskalakis et al [6]. Further, we consider a partial information
version of the problem. We then apply the results to convex programming and exhibit a simple algorithm for the
approximateMax Flow problem.
1 Introduction
Recently, no-regret algorithms have received increasing attention in a variety of communities, including theoreti-
cal computer science, optimization, and game theory [3, 1]. The wide applicability of these algorithms is arguably
due to the black-box regret guarantees that hold for arbitrary sequences. However, such regret guarantees can be
loose if the sequence being encountered is not “worst-case”. The reduction in “arbitrariness” of the sequence can
arise from the particular structure of the problem at hand, and should be exploited. For instance, in some applica-
tions of online methods, the sequence comes from an additional computation done by the learner, thus being far
from arbitrary.
One way to formally capture the partially benign nature of data is through a notion of predictable sequences
[11]. We exhibit applications of this idea in several domains. First, we show that the Mirror Prox method [9],
designed for optimizing non-smooth structured saddle-point problems, can be viewed as an instance of the pre-
dictable sequence approach. Predictability in this case is due precisely to smoothness of the inner optimization
part and the saddle-point structure of the problem. We extend the results to Hölder-smooth functions, interpolat-
ing between the case of well-predictable gradients and “unpredictable” gradients.
Second, we address the question raised in [6] about existence of “simple” algorithms that converge at the rate
of O˜(T−1)when employed in an uncoupled manner by players in a zero-sum finite matrix game, yet maintain the
usualO(T−1/2) rate against arbitrary sequences. We give a positive answer and exhibit a fully adaptive algorithm
that does not require the prior knowledge of whether the other player is collaborating. Here, the additional pre-
dictability comes from the fact that both players attempt to converge to theminimax value. We also tackle a partial
information version of the problemwhere the player has only access to the real-valued payoff of themixed actions
played by the two players on each round rather than the entire vector.
Our third application is to convex programming: optimization of a linear function subject to convex con-
straints. This problem often arises in theoretical computer science, and we show that the idea of predictable se-
quences can be used here too. We provide a simple algorithm for ǫ-approximateMax Flow for a graphwith d edges
with time complexity O˜(d3/2/ǫ), a performance previously obtained through a relatively involved procedure [8].
1
2 Online Learning with Predictable Gradient Sequences
Let us describe the online convex optimization (OCO) problem and the basic algorithm studied in [4, 11]. Let F
be a convex set of moves of the learner. On round t = 1, . . . ,T , the learner makes a prediction ft ∈F and observes a
convex function Gt onF . The objective is to keep regret
1
T
T∑
t=1Gt ( ft)−Gt ( f ∗)
small for any f ∗ ∈F . LetRbe a 1-strongly convex functionw.r.t. somenorm ∥⋅∥onF , and let g0 = argming∈FR(g).
Suppose that at the beginning of every round t , the learner has access to Mt , a vector computable based on the
past observations or side information. In this paper we study the Optimistic Mirror Descent algorithm, defined
by the interleaved sequence
ft = argmin
f ∈F ηt ⟨ f ,Mt ⟩+DR( f ,gt−1) , gt = argming∈F ηt ⟨g ,∇Gt( ft )⟩+DR(g ,gt−1) (1)
where DR is the Bregman Divergence with respect to R and {ηt} is a sequence of step sizes that can be chosen
adaptively based on the sequence observed so far. The method adheres to the OCO protocol since Mt is available
at the beginning of round t , and ∇Gt ( ft ) becomes available after the prediction ft is made. The sequence { ft}
will be called primary, while {gt} – secondary. This method was proposed in [4] for Mt = ∇Gt−1( ft−1), and the
following lemma is a straightforward extension of the result in [11] for generalMt :
Lemma 1. Let F be a convex set in a Banach space B. Let R ∶ B → R be a 1-strongly convex function on F with
respect to some norm ∥ ⋅∥, and let ∥ ⋅∥∗ denote the dual norm. For any fixed step-size η, the Optimistic Mirror Descent
Algorithm yields, for any f ∗ ∈ F ,
T∑
t=1Gt( ft )−Gt( f ∗) ≤
T∑
t=1⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩ ≤ η−1R2 +
T∑
t=1∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥−
1
2η
T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2+∥gt−1 − ft ∥2) (2)
where R ≥ 0 is such thatDR( f ∗,g0) ≤R2 and∇t =∇Gt ( ft ).
When applying the lemma, we will often use the simple fact that
∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥ = inf
ρ>0{
ρ
2
∥∇t −Mt ∥2∗+ 12ρ ∥gt − ft ∥2} . (3)
In particular, by setting ρ = η, we obtain the (unnormalized) regret bound of η−1R2+(η/2)∑Tt=1 ∥∇t −Mt ∥2∗, which
is R
√
2∑Tt=1 ∥∇t −Mt ∥2∗ by choosing η optimally. Since this choice is not known ahead of time, one may either
employ the doubling trick, or choose the step size adaptively:
Corollary 2. Consider step size
ηt =Rmaxmin
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
⎛
⎝
¿ÁÁÀt−1∑
i=1 ∥∇i −Mi ∥
2∗+
¿ÁÁÀt−2∑
i=1 ∥∇i −Mi ∥
2∗⎞⎠
−1
,1
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
with R2max = sup f ,g∈F DR( f ,g). Then regret of the Optimistic Mirror Descent algorithm is upper bounded by
3.5Rmax
√∑Tt=1 ∥∇t −Mt ∥2∗+1
T
.
2
These results indicate that tighter regret bounds are possible if one can guess thenext gradient∇t by computing
Mt . One such case arises in offline optimization of a smooth function, whereby the previous gradient turns out to
be a good proxy for the next one. More precisely, suppose we aim to optimize a function G( f ) whose gradients
are Lipschitz continuous: ∥∇G( f )−∇G(g)∥∗ ≤H∥ f − g∥ for some H > 0. In this optimization setting, no guessing
of Mt is needed: we may simply query the oracle for the gradient and set Mt =∇G(gt−1). The Optimistic Mirror
Descent then becomes
ft = argmin
f ∈F ηt ⟨ f ,∇G(gt−1)⟩+DR( f ,gt−1) , gt = argming∈F ηt ⟨g ,∇G( ft )⟩+DR(g ,gt−1)
which can be recognized as the Mirror Prox method, due to Nemirovski [9]. By smoothness, ∥∇G( ft )−Mt ∥∗ =∥∇G( ft )−∇G(gt−1)∥∗ ≤H∥ ft − gt−1∥. Lemma 1 with Eq. (3) and ρ = η = 1/H immediately yields a bound
T∑
t=1G( ft)−G( f ∗) ≤HR2 ,
which implies that the average f¯T = 1T ∑Tt=1 ft satisfies G( f¯T )−G( f ∗) ≤ HR2/T , a known bound for Mirror Prox.
We now extend this result to arbitrary α-Hölder smooth functions, that is convex functions G such that ∥∇G( f )−∇G(g)∥∗ ≤H∥ f − g∥α for all f ,g ∈F .
Lemma 3. Let F be a convex set in a Banach space B and letR ∶ B→ R be a 1-strongly convex function on F with
respect to some norm ∥ ⋅∥. Let G be a convex α-Hölder smooth function with constant H > 0 and α ∈ [0,1]. Then the
average f¯T = 1T ∑Tt=1 ft of the trajectory given by Optimistic Mirror Descent Algorithm enjoys
G( f¯T )− inf
f ∈FG( f ) ≤
8HR1+α
T
1+α
2
where R ≥ 0 is such that sup f ∈FDR( f ,g0) ≤R.
This result provides a smooth interpolation between the T−1/2 rate at α = 0 (that is, no predictability of the
gradient is possible) and the T−1 rate when the smoothness structure allows for a dramatic speed up with a very
simple modification of the original Mirror Descent.
3 Structured Optimization
In this section we consider the structured optimization problem
argmin
f ∈F G( f )
whereG( f ) is of the formG( f ) = supx∈X φ( f ,x) with φ(⋅,x) convex for every x ∈ X and φ( f , ⋅) concave for every
f ∈F . BothF andX are assumed to be convex sets. WhileG itself need not be smooth, it has been recognized that
the structure can be exploited to improve rates of optimization if the function φ is smooth [10]. From the point of
view of online learning, wewill see that the optimization problem of the saddle point type can be solved by playing
two online convex optimization algorithms against each other (henceforth called Players I and II).
Specifically, assume that Player I produces a sequence f1, . . . , fT by using a regret-minimization algorithm, such
that
1
T
T∑
t=1φ( ft ,xt )− inff ∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1φ( f ,xt ) ≤Rate1(x1, . . . ,xT ) (4)
and Player II produces x1, . . . ,xT with
1
T
T∑
t=1(−φ( ft ,xt ))− infx∈X
1
T
T∑
t=1(−φ( ft ,x)) ≤Rate2( f1, . . . , fT ) . (5)
3
By a standard argument (see e.g. [7]),
inf
f
1
T
T∑
t=1φ( f ,xt ) ≤ inff φ( f , x¯T ) ≤ supx inff φ( f ,x) ≤ inff supx φ( f ,x) ≤ supx φ( f¯T ,x) ≤ supx
1
T
T∑
t=1φ( ft ,x)
where f¯T = 1T ∑Tt=1 ft and x¯T = 1T ∑Tt=1 xt . By adding (4) and (5), we have
sup
x∈X
1
T
T∑
t=1φ( ft ,x)− inff ∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1φ( f ,xt ) ≤Rate1(x1, . . . ,xT )+Rate2( f1, . . . , fT ) (6)
which sandwiches the previous sequence of inequalities up to the sum of regret rates and implies near-optimality
of f¯T and x¯T .
Lemma 4. Suppose both players employ the Optimistic Mirror Descent algorithm with, respectively, predictable
sequences M1t and M
2
t , 1-strongly convex functions R1 on F (w.r.t. ∥ ⋅ ∥F ) and R2 on X (w.r.t. ∥ ⋅ ∥X ), and fixed
learning rates η and η′. Let { ft} and {xt} denote the primary sequences of the players while let {gt},{yt} denote the
secondary. Then for any α,β > 0,
sup
x∈X φ( f¯T ,x)− inff ∈F supx∈X φ( f ,x) (7)
≤ R21
η
+ α
2
T∑
t=1∥∇ f φ( ft ,xt )−M1t ∥2F∗ +
1
2α
T∑
t=1∥gt − ft ∥
2F − 12η
T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2F +∥gt−1 − ft ∥2F)
+ R22
η′ + β2
T∑
t=1∥∇xφ( ft ,xt )−M2t ∥2X∗ +
1
2β
T∑
t=1∥yt − xt ∥
2X − 12η′
T∑
t=1(∥yt − xt ∥
2X +∥yt−1 − xt ∥2X )
where R1 and R2 are such thatDR1( f ∗,g0) ≤R21 andDR2(x∗, y0) ≤R22 , and f¯T = 1T ∑Tt=1 ft .
The proof of Lemma 4 is immediate from Lemma 1. We obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 5. Suppose φ ∶F ×X ↦R is Hölder smooth in the following sense:
∥∇ f φ( f ,x)−∇f φ(g ,x)∥F∗ ≤H1∥ f − g∥αF , ∥∇ f φ( f ,x)−∇ f φ( f , y)∥F∗ ≤H2∥x− y∥α′X
and ∥∇xφ( f ,x)−∇xφ(g ,x)∥X∗ ≤H4∥ f − g∥βF , ∥∇xφ( f ,x)−∇xφ( f , y)∥X∗ ≤H3∥x− y∥β′X .
Let γ =min{α,α′,β,β′}, H =max{H1,H2,H3,H4}. Suppose both players employ Optimistic Mirror Descent with
M1t =∇ f φ(gt−1, yt−1) and M2t =∇xφ(gt−1, yt−1), where {gt} and {yt} are the secondary sequences updated by the
two algorithms, and with step sizes η = η′ = (R21 +R22) 1−γ2 (2H)−1 (T2 ) γ−12 . Then
sup
x∈X φ( f¯T ,x)− inff ∈F supx∈X φ( f ,x) ≤
4H(R21 +R22) 1+γ2
T
1+γ
2
(8)
As revealed in the proof of this corollary, the negative terms in (7), that come from an upper bound on regret of
Player I, in fact contribute to cancellations with positive terms in regret of Player II, and vice versa. Such a coupling
of the upper bounds on regret of the two players can be seen as leading to faster rates under the appropriate
assumptions, and this idea will be exploited to a great extent in the proofs of the next section.
4 Zero-sum Game and Uncoupled Dynamics
The notions of a zero-sum matrix game and a minimax equilibrium are arguably the most basic and important
notions of game theory. The tight connectionbetween linear programming andminimax equilibrium suggests that
theremight be simple dynamics that can lead the two players of the game to eventually converge to the equilibrium
4
value. Existence of such simple or natural dynamics is of interest in behavioral economics, where one asks whether
agents can discover static solution concepts of the game iteratively and without extensive communication.
More formally, let A ∈ [−1,1]n×m be a matrix with bounded entries. The two players aim to find a pair of near-
optimal mixed strategies ( f¯ , x¯) ∈ ∆n ×∆m such that f¯ TAx¯ is close to the minimax value min f ∈∆n maxx∈∆m f TAx,
where ∆n is the probability simplex over n actions. Of course, this is a particular form of the saddle point problem
considered in the previous section, with φ( f ,x) = f TAx. It is well-known (and follows immediately from (6)) that
the players can compute near-optimal strategies by simply playing no-regret algorithms [7]. More precisely, on
round t , the players I and II “predict” the mixed strategies ft and xt and observe Axt and f
T
t A, respectively. While
black-box regretminimization algorithms, such as Exponential Weights, immediately yieldO(T−1/2) convergence
rates, Daskalakis et al [6] asked whether faster methods exist. To make the problem well-posed, it is required that
the two players are strongly uncoupled: neither A nor the number of available actions of the opponent is known
to either player, no “funny bit arithmetic” is allowed, and memory storage of each player allows only for constant
number of payoff vectors. The authors of [6] exhibited a near-optimal algorithm that, if used by both players, yields
a pair of mixed strategies that constitutes anO( log(m+n)(logT+(log(m+n))3/2)
T
)-approximate minimax equilibrium.
Furthermore, the method has a regret bound of the same order as Exponential Weights when faced with an arbi-
trary sequence. The algorithm in [6] is an application of the excessive gap technique of Nesterov, and requires care-
ful choreography and interleaving of rounds between the two non-communicating players. The authors, therefore,
asked whether a simple algorithm (e.g. a modification of Exponential Weights) can in fact achieve the same result.
We answer this in the affirmative. While a direct application of Mirror Prox does not yield the result (and also does
not provide strong decoupling), belowwe show that amodification of Optimistic Mirror Descent achieves the goal.
Furthermore, by choosing the step size adaptively, the same method guarantees the typicalO(T−1/2) regret if not
faced with a compliant player, thus ensuring robustness.
In Section 4.1, we analyze the “first-order information” version of the problem, as described above: upon play-
ing the respective mixed strategies ft and xt on round t , Player I observes Axt and Player II observes f
T
t A. Then, in
Section 4.2, we consider an interesting extension to partial information, whereby the players submit their moves
ft ,xt but only observe the real value f
T
t Axt . Recall that in both cases the matrix A is not known to the players.
4.1 First-Order Information
Consider the following simple algorithm. Initialize f0 = g ′0 ∈ ∆n and x0 = y ′0 ∈ ∆m to be uniform distributions, set
β = 1/T 2 and proceed as follows:
On round t, Player I performs
Play ft and observe Axt
Update gt(i)∝ g ′t−1(i)exp{−ηt [Axt ]i}, g ′t = (1−β)gt +(β/n)1n
ft+1(i)∝ g ′t(i)exp{−ηt+1[Axt ]i}
while simultaneously Player II performs
Play xt and observe f
⊺
t A
Update yt(i)∝ y ′t−1(i)exp{−η′t [ f Tt A]i}, y ′t = (1−β) yt +(β/m)1m
xt+1(i)∝ y ′t (i)exp{−η′t+1[ f Tt A]i}
Here, 1n ∈ Rn is a vector of all ones and both [b]i and b(i) refer to the i -th coordinate of a vector b. Other than
the “mixing in” of the uniform distribution, the algorithm for both players is simply the Optimistic Mirror Descent
with the (negative) entropy function. In fact, the step of mixing in the uniform distribution is only needed when
some coordinate of gt (resp., yt ) is smaller than 1/(nT 2). Furthermore, this step is also not needed if none of the
players deviate from the prescribed method. In such a case, the resulting algorithm is simply the constant step-
5
size Exponential Weights ft (i)∝ exp{−η∑t−2s=1[Axs−1]i +2η[Axt−1]i}, but with a factor 2 in front of the latest loss
vector!
Proposition 6. Let A ∈ [−1,1]n×m , F = ∆n , X = ∆m . If both players use above algorithm with, respectively, M1t =
Axt−1 and M2t = f Tt−1A, and the adaptive step sizes
ηt =min{log(nT )(√∑t−1i=1 ∥Axi − Axi−1∥2∗+
√∑t−2i=1 ∥Axi − Axi−1∥2∗)−1 , 111}
and
η′t =min{log(mT )(√∑t−1i=1 ∥ f Ti A− f Ti−1A∥2∗+
√∑t−2i=1 ∥ f Ti A− f Ti−1A∥2∗)
−1
, 1
11
}
respectively, then the pair ( f¯T , x¯T ) is an O ( logm+logn+logTT )-approximate minimax equilibrium. Furthermore, if
only one player (say, Player I) follows the above algorithm, her regret against any sequence x1, . . . ,xT of plays is
O⎛⎝ log(nT )T
⎛
⎝
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥Axt − Axt−1∥
2∗+1⎞⎠
⎞
⎠ . (9)
In particular, this implies the worst-case regret ofO( log(nT)√
T
) in the general setting of online linear optimization.
We remark that (9) can give intermediate rates for regret in the case that the second player deviates from the
prescribed strategy but produces “stable” moves. For instance, if the second player employs a mirror descent
algorithm (or Follow the Regularized Leader / Exponential Weights method) with step size η, one can typically
show stability ∥xt − xt−1∥ =O(η). In this case, (9) yields the rateO(η logT√
T
) for the first player. A typical setting of
η∝ T−1/2 for the second player still ensures theO(logT /T ) regret for the first player.
Let us finish with a technical remark. The reason for the extra step of “mixing in” the uniform distribution
stems from the goal of having an adaptive and robust method that still attainsO(T−1/2) regret if the other player
deviates from using the algorithm. If one is only interested in the dynamics when both players cooperate, this
step is not necessary, and in this case the extraneous logT factor disappears from the above bound, leading to the
O ( logn+logm
T
) convergence. On the technical side, the need for the extra step is the following. The adaptive step
size result of Corollary 2 involves the term R2max ≥ supg DR1( f ∗,g) which is potentially infinite for the negative
entropy function R1. It is possible that the doubling trick or the analysis of Auer et al [2] (who encountered the
same problem for the Exponential Weights algorithm) can remove the extra logT factor while still preserving the
regret minimization property. We also remark that Rmax is small when R1 is instead the p-norm; hence, the use
of this regularizer avoids the extraneous logarithmic in T factor while still preserving the logarithmic dependence
on n andm. However, projection onto the simplex under the p-norm is not as elegant as the Exponential Weights
update.
4.2 Partial Information
We now turn to the partial (or, zero-th order) information model. Recall that the matrix A is not known to the play-
ers, yet we are interested in finding ǫ-optimal minimax strategies. On each round, the two players choose mixed
strategies ft ∈∆n and xt ∈∆m , respectively, and observe f Tt Axt . Now the question is, howmany such observations
do we need to get to an ǫ-optimal minimax strategy? Can this be done while still ensuring the usual no-regret rate?
The specific setting we consider below requires that on each round t , the two players play four times, and that
these four plays are δ-close to each other (that is, ∥ f it − f jt ∥1 ≤ δ for i , j ∈ {1, . . . ,4}). Interestingly, up to logarithmic
factors, the fast rate of the previous section is possible even in this scenario, but we do require the knowledge of
the number of actions of the opposing player (or, an upper bound on this number). We leave it as an open problem
the question of whether one can attain the 1/T -type rate with only one play per round.
6
Player I
u1, . . . ,un−1 : orthonormal basis of ∆n
Initialize g1 , f1 =
1
n 1n ; Draw i0 ∼Unif([n−1])
At time t = 1 to T
Play ft
Draw it ∼Unif([n−1])
Observe :
r+t = ( ft +δuit−1 )⊺Axt
r−t = ( ft −δuit−1 )⊺Axt
r¯
+
t = ( ft +δuit )
⊺
Axt
r¯−t = ( ft −δuit )⊺Axt
Build estimates :
aˆt =
n
2δ
(r+t − r−t )uit−1
a¯t =
n
2δ
(r¯+t − r¯−t )uit
Update :
gt (i)∝ g
′
t−1(i)exp{−ηt aˆt (i)}
g ′t = (1−β) gt +(β/n)1
ft+1(i)∝ g ′t (i)exp{−ηt+1 a¯t (i)}
End
Player II
v1, . . . ,vm−1 : orthonormal basis of ∆m
Initialize y1,x1 =
1
m 1m ; Draw j0 ∼Unif([m−1])
At time t = 1 to T
Play xt
Draw jt ∼Unif([m−1])
Observe :
s+t = − f ⊺t A(xt +δv jt−1)
s−t = − f ⊺t A(xt −δv jt−1)
s¯+t = − f ⊺t A(xt +δv jt )
s¯−t = − f ⊺t A(xt −δv jt )
Build estimates :
bˆt =
m
2δ
(s+t − s−t )v jt−1
b¯t =
m
2δ
(s¯+t − s¯−t )v jt
Update :
yt (i)∝ y
′
t−1(i)exp{−η′t bˆt (i)}
y
′
t = (1−β) yt +(β/m)1
xt+1(i)∝ y′t (i)exp{−η′t+1b¯t (i)}
End
Lemma 7. Let A ∈ [−1,1]n×m , F = ∆n , X = ∆m , let δ be small enough (e.g. exponentially small in m,n,T ), and let
β = 1/T 2. If both players use above algorithms with the adaptive step sizes
ηt =min{√log(nT )
√∑t−1i=1∥aˆi−a¯i−1∥2∗−
√∑t−2i=1∥aˆi−a¯i−1∥2∗∥aˆt−1−a¯t−2∥2∗ ,
1
28m
√
log(mT)}
and
η′t =min
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
√
log(mT )
√∑t−1i=1∥bˆi−b¯i−1∥2∗−
√∑t−2i=1∥bˆi−b¯i−1∥2∗
∥bˆt−1−b¯t−2∥2∗ ,
1
28n
√
log(nT)
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
respectively, then the pair ( f¯T , x¯T ) is an
O⎛⎝
(m log(nT )√log(mT )+n log(mT )√log(nT ))
T
⎞
⎠
-approximate minimax equilibrium. Furthermore, if only one player (say, Player I) follows the above algorithm, her
regret against any sequence x1, . . . ,xT of plays is bounded by
O⎛⎜⎝
m
√
log(mT ) log(nT )+n√log(nT )∑Tt=1 ∥xt − xt−1∥2
T
⎞⎟⎠
We leave it as an open problem to find an algorithm that attains the 1/T -type rate when both players only
observe the value eTi Ae j = Ai , j upon drawing pure actions i , j from their respective mixed strategies ft ,xt . We
hypothesize a rate better than T−1/2 is not possible in this scenario.
5 Approximate Smooth Convex Programming
In this section we show how one can use the structured optimization results from Section 3 for approximately
solving convex programming problems. Specifically consider the optimization problem
argmax
f ∈G c
⊺ f (10)
s.t. ∀i ∈ [d], Gi( f ) ≤ 1
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where G is a convex set and eachGi is anH-smooth convex function. Let the optimal value of the above optimiza-
tion problem be given by F∗ > 0, and without loss of generality assume F∗ is known (one typically performs binary
search if it is not known). Define the sets F = { f ∶ f ∈ G,c⊺ f = F∗} and X =∆d . The convex programming problem
in (10) can now be reformulated as
argmin
f ∈F maxi∈[d]Gi( f ) = argminf ∈F supx∈X
d∑
i=1 x(i)Gi( f ) . (11)
This problem is in the saddle-point form, as studied earlier in the paper. Wemay think of the first player as aiming
to minimize the above expression over F , while the second player maximizes over a mixture of constraints with
the aim of violating at least one of them.
Lemma 8. Fix γ,ǫ > 0. Assume there exists f0 ∈ G such that c⊺ f0 ≥ 0 and for every i ∈ [d], Gi ( f0) ≤ 1−γ. Suppose
each Gi is 1-Lipschitz overF . Consider the solution
fˆT = (1−α) f¯T +α f0
whereα = ǫ
ǫ+γ and f¯T = 1T ∑Tt=1 ft ∈F is the average of the trajectory of the procedure in Lemma4 for the optimization
problem (11). Let R1(⋅) = 12 ∥⋅∥22 and R2 be the entropy function. Further let B be a known constant such that B ≥∥ f ∗− g0∥2 where g0 ∈ F is some initialization and f ∗ ∈F is the (unknown) solution to the optimization problem. Set
η = argmin
η≤H−1 {B
2
η
+ η logd
1−ηH }, η′ = 1η −H, M1t =∑di=1 yt−1(i)∇Gi(gt−1) and M2t = (G1(gt−1), . . . ,Gd(gt−1)). Let number
of iterations T be such that
T > 1
ǫ
inf
η≤H−1{
B2
η
+ η logd
1−ηH }
We then have that fˆT ∈ G satisfies all d constraints and is ǫγ -approximate, that is
c⊺ fˆT ≥ (1− ǫ
γ
)F∗ .
Lemma 8 tells us that using the predictable sequences approach for the two players, one can obtain an ǫ
γ
-
approximate solution to the smooth convex programming problem in number of iterations at most order 1/ǫ. If T1
(reps. T2) is the time complexity for single update of the predictable sequence algorithm of Player I (resp. Player
2), then time complexity of the overall procedure isO(T1+T2
ǫ
)
5.1 Application to Max-Flow
We now apply the above result to the problem of finding Max Flow between a source and a sink in a network,
such that the capacity constraint on each edge is satisfied. For simplicity, consider a network where each edge
has capacity 1 (the method can be easily extended to the case of varying capacity). Suppose the number of edges
d in the network is the same order as number of vertices in the network. The Max Flow problem can be seen
as an instance of a convex (linear) programming problem, and we apply the proposed algorithm for structured
optimization to obtain an approximate solution.
For the Max Flow problem, the sets G and F are given by sets of linear equalities. Further, if we use Euclidean
norm squared as regularizer for the flow player, then projection step can be performed in O(d) time using con-
jugate gradient method. This is because we are simply minimizing Euclidean norm squared subject to equality
constraints which is well conditioned. Hence T1 =O(d). Similarly, the Exponential Weights update has time com-
plexityO(d) as there are order d constraints, and so overall time complexity to produce ǫ approximate solution is
given byO(nd), where n is the number of iterations of the proposed procedure.
Once again, we shall assume that we know the value of themaximum flow F∗ (for, otherwise, we can use binary
search to obtain it).
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Corollary 9. Applying the procedure for smooth convex programming from Lemma 8 to the Max Flow problemwith
f0 = 0 ∈ G the 0 flow, the time complexity to compute an ǫ-approximate Max Flow is bounded by
O(d3/2
√
logd
ǫ
) .
This time complexity matches the known result from [8], but with amuch simpler procedure (gradient descent
for the flow player and Exponential Weights for the constraints). It would be interesting to see whether the tech-
niques presented here can be used to improve the dependence on d to d4/3 or better while maintaining the 1/ǫ
dependence. While the result of [5] has the improved d4/3 dependence, the complexity in terms of ǫ ismuchworse.
6 Discussion
We close this paper with a discussion. As we showed, the notion of using extra information about the sequence
is a powerful tool with applications in optimization, convex programming, game theory, to name a few. All the
applications considered in this paper, however, used some notion of smoothness for constructing the predictable
processMt . An interesting direction of further research is to isolate more general conditions under which the next
gradient is predictable, perhaps even when the functions are not smooth in any sense. For instance one could use
techniques from bundle methods to further restrict the set of possible gradients the function being optimized can
have at various points in the feasible set. This could then be used to solve for the right predictable sequence to use
so as to optimize the bounds. Using this notion of selecting predictable sequences one can hope to derive adaptive
optimization procedures that in practice can provide rapid convergence.
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Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. For any f ∗ ∈F ,
⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩ = ⟨ ft − gt ,∇t −Mt ⟩+ ⟨ ft − gt ,Mt ⟩+ ⟨gt − f ∗,∇t ⟩ (12)
First observe that
⟨ ft − gt ,∇t −Mt ⟩ ≤ ∥ ft − gt ∥∥∇t −Mt∥∗ . (13)
Any update of the form a∗ = argmina∈A ⟨a,x⟩+DR(a,c) satisfies for any d ∈ A
⟨a∗−d ,x⟩ ≤DR(d ,c)−DR(d ,a∗)−DR(a∗,c) . (14)
This yields
⟨ ft − gt ,Mt ⟩ ≤ 1
η
(DR(gt ,gt−1)−DR(gt , ft )−DR( ft ,gt−1)) (15)
and
⟨gt − f ∗,∇t ⟩ ≤ 1
η
(DR( f ∗,gt−1)−DR( f ∗,gt )−DR(gt ,gt−1)) . (16)
Combining, ⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩ is upper bounded by
∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥ft − gt∥+ 1η (DR(gt ,gt−1)−DR(gt , ft )−DR( ft ,gt−1))
+ 1
η
(DR( f ∗,gt−1)−DR( f ∗,gt )−DR(gt ,gt−1)))
= ∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥ ft − gt ∥+ 1η (DR( f ∗,gt−1)−DR( f ∗,gt )−DR(gt , ft )−DR( ft ,gt−1))
≤ ∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥ ft − gt ∥+ 1η (DR( f ∗,gt−1)−DR( f ∗,gt)− 12 ∥gt − ft ∥2 − 12 ∥gt−1 − ft ∥2) (17)
where in the last step we used strong convexity: for any f , f ′, DR( f , f ′) ≥ 12 ∥ f − f ′∥2. Summing over t = 1, . . . ,T
yields, for any f ∗ ∈F ,
T∑
t=1⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩≤ η−1DR( f ∗,g0)+
T∑
t=1∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥−
1
2η
T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2+∥gt−1 − ft ∥2) .
Appealing to convexity ofGt ’s completes the proof.
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Proof of Corollary 2. Let us re-work the proof of Lemma 1 for the case of a changing ηt . Eq. (15) and (16) are now
replaced by
⟨ ft − gt ,Mt ⟩ ≤ 1
ηt
(DR(gt ,gt−1)−DR(gt , ft )−DR( ft ,gt−1)) (18)
and
⟨gt − f ∗,∇t ⟩ ≤ 1
ηt
(DR( f ∗,gt−1)−DR( f ∗,gt )−DR(gt ,gt−1)) . (19)
The upper bound of Eq. (17) becomes
∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥ ft − gt∥+ 1ηt (DR( f ∗,gt−1)−DR( f ∗,gt )−
1
2
∥gt − ft ∥2− 1
2
∥gt−1− ft ∥2) .
Summing over t = 1, . . . ,T yields, for any f ∗ ∈F ,
T∑
t=1⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩ ≤ η−11 DR( f ∗,g0)+
T∑
t=2DR( f ∗,gt−1)(
1
ηt
− 1
ηt−1 )+
T∑
t=1∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥
− T∑
t=1
1
2ηt
(∥gt − ft ∥2+∥gt−1− ft ∥2)
≤ (η−11 +η−1T )R2max+ T∑
t=1∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥−
1
2
T∑
t=1η
−1
t (∥gt − ft ∥2+∥gt−1 − ft ∥2) (20)
Observe that
ηt =Rmaxmin
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1√∑t−1i=1 ∥∇i −Mi ∥2∗ +
√∑t−2i=1 ∥∇i −Mi ∥2∗
,1
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
(21)
=Rmaxmin
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
√∑t−1i=1 ∥∇i −Mi ∥2∗ −
√∑t−2i=1 ∥∇i −Mi ∥2∗∥∇t−1 −Mt−1∥2∗ ,1
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
(22)
From (21),
η−1t ≤R−1maxmax
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩2
¿ÁÁÀt−1∑
i=1 ∥∇i −Mi ∥
2∗,1
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ .
Using this step size in Equation (20) and defining η1 = 1,∑Tt=1 ⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩ is upper bounded by
Rmax
⎛
⎝2
¿ÁÁÀT−1∑
t=1 ∥∇t −Mt ∥
2∗+2⎞⎠+
T∑
t=1∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥−
1
2
T∑
t=1η
−1
t (∥gt − ft ∥2+∥gt−1 − ft ∥2)
≤Rmax⎛⎝2
¿ÁÁÀT−1∑
t=1 ∥∇t −Mt ∥
2∗+2⎞⎠+ 12
T∑
t=1ηt+1 ∥∇t −Mt ∥
2∗+ 12
T∑
t=1η
−1
t+1 ∥ft − gt∥2− 1
2
T∑
t=1η
−1
t ∥gt − ft ∥2
where we used (3) with ρ = ηt+1 and dropped one of the positive terms. The last two terms can be upper bounded
as
1
2
T∑
t=1η
−1
t+1 ∥ ft − gt∥2− 1
2
T∑
t=1η
−1
t ∥gt − ft ∥2 ≤ R2max
2
T∑
t=1(η−1t+1 −η−1t ) ≤
R2max
2
η−1T+1 ,
11
yielding an upper bound
Rmax
⎛
⎝2
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥∇t −Mt ∥
2∗+2⎞⎠+ 12
T∑
t=1ηt+1 ∥∇t −Mt ∥
2∗ + R2max2 η−1T+1
≤ 3Rmax⎛⎝
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥∇t −Mt ∥
2∗+1⎞⎠+ 12
T∑
t=1ηt+1 ∥∇t −Mt ∥
2∗ .
In view of (21), we arrive at
3Rmax
⎛
⎝
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥∇t −Mt ∥
2∗ +1⎞⎠+ Rmax2
T∑
t=1
⎛
⎝
¿ÁÁÀ t∑
i=1∥∇i −Mi ∥
2∗ −
¿ÁÁÀt−1∑
i=1 ∥∇i −Mi ∥
2∗⎞⎠
≤ 3Rmax⎛⎝
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥∇t −Mt ∥
2∗ +1⎞⎠+ Rmax2
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
i=1∥∇i −Mi ∥
2∗
≤ 3.5 Rmax⎛⎝
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥∇t −Mt∥
2∗ +1⎞⎠
Proof of Lemma 3. Let∇t =∇G( ft ) andMt =∇G(gt−1). Then by Lemma 1 and by Hölder smoothness,
T∑
t=1⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩ ≤
R2
η
+H T∑
t=1∥gt − ft ∥
1+α− 1
2η
T∑
t=1∥gt − ft ∥
2
. (23)
We can re-write the middle term in the upper bound as
H
T∑
t=1∥gt − ft ∥
1+α = T∑
t=1H ((1+α)η)
1+α
2 ( ∥gt − ft ∥√(1+α)η)
1+α
≤ ( T∑
t=1H
2
1−α ((1+α)η) 1+α1−α )
1−α
2 ( T∑
t=1
∥gt − ft ∥2(1+α)η )
1+α
2
by Hölder’s inequality with conjugate powers 1/p = (1−α)/2 and 1/q = (1+α)/2. We further upper bound the last
term using AM-GM inequality as
1−α
2
(TH 21−α (1+α) 1+α1−α η 1+α1−α )+ 1
2η
T∑
t=1∥gt − ft ∥
2
.
Plugging into (23),
T∑
t=1⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩ ≤
R2
η
+ 1−α
2
(TH 21−α (1+α) 1+α1−α η 1+α1−α ) .
Setting η =R1−αH−1(1+α)− 1+α2 (1−α)− 1−α2 T− 1−α2 yields an upper bound of
T∑
t=1⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩ ≤HR1+α(1+α)
1+α
2 (1−α) 1−α2 T 1−α2 ≤ 8HR1+αT 1−α2 .
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Proof of Corollary 5. Using Lemma 4,
sup
x∈X φ(
1
T
T∑
t=1 ft ,x)− inff ∈F supx∈X φ( f ,x)
≤ R21
η
+ η
2
T∑
t=1∥∇ f φ( ft ,xt )−∇ f φ(gt−1, yt−1)∥2F∗ −
1
2η
T∑
t=1∥gt−1− ft ∥
2F
+ R22
η′ + η
′
2
T∑
t=1∥∇xφ( ft ,xt )−∇xφ(gt−1, yt−1)∥2X∗ −
1
2η′
T∑
t=1∥yt−1 − xt ∥
2X
Using ∥a+b∥2 ≤ 2∥a∥2+2∥b∥2 and the smoothness assumption yields
η
2
T∑
t=1∥∇ f φ( ft ,xt )−∇ f φ(gt−1, yt−1)∥2F∗
≤ η T∑
t=1∥∇ f φ( ft ,xt )−∇ f φ(gt−1,xt )∥2F∗ +η
T∑
t=1∥∇ f φ(gt−1,xt )−∇ f φ(gt−1, yt−1)∥2F∗
≤ ηH21 T∑
t=1∥ ft − gt−1∥2αF +ηH22
T∑
t=1∥xt − yt−1∥2α
′X
and similarly
η′
2
T∑
t=1∥∇xφ( ft ,xt )−∇xφ(gt−1, yt−1)∥2X∗
≤ η′ T∑
t=1∥∇xφ( ft ,xt )−∇xφ( ft , yt−1)∥2X∗ +η′
T∑
t=1∥∇xφ( ft , yt−1)−∇xφ(gt−1, yt−1)∥2X∗
≤ η′H23 T∑
t=1∥xt − yt−1∥
2β′X +η′H24 T∑
t=1∥ ft − gt−1∥
2βF .
Combining, we get the upper bound of
R21
η
+ T∑
t=1(4αη)αηH21 (
∥ ft − gt−1∥F√
4αη
)2α+ T∑
t=1(4α′η′)α
′
ηH22 (∥xt − yt−1∥X√
4α′η′ )
2α′ − 1
2η
T∑
t=1∥gt−1 − ft ∥
2F
+ R22
η′ +
T∑
t=1(4β′η′)β
′
η′H23 (∥xt − yt−1∥X√
4β′η′ )
2β′ + T∑
t=1(4βη)βη′H24 (
∥ ft − gt−1∥F√
4βη
)2β− 1
2η′
T∑
t=1∥yt−1 − xt ∥
2X
As in the proof of Lemma 3, we use Hölder inequality to further upper bound by
R21
η
+ R22
η′ − 12η
T∑
t=1∥gt−1− ft ∥
2F − 12η′
T∑
t=1∥yt−1 − xt ∥
2X (24)
+(T (4αη) α1−α η 11−α H 21−α1 )1−α( T∑
t=1
∥ ft − gt−1∥2F
4αη
)α+(T (4α′η′) α′1−α′ η 11−α′ H 21−α′2 )1−α
′ ( T∑
t=1
∥xt − yt−1∥2X
4α′η′ )
α′
+(T (4β′η′) β′1−β′ η′ 11−β′ H 21−β′3 )
1−β′ ( T∑
t=1
∥xt − yt−1∥2X
4β′η′ )
β′ +(T (4βη) β1−β η′ 11−βH 21−β4 )
1−β( T∑
t=1
∥ ft − gt−1∥2F
4βη
)β
≤ R21
η
+ R22
η′ +((1−α)(4αη) α1−α η 11−α H
2
1−α
1 )T +((1−α′)(4α′η′) α′1−α′ η 11−α′ H 21−α′2 )T
+((1−β′)(4β′η′) β′1−β′ η′ 11−β′ H 21−β′3 )T +((1−β)(4βη) β1−β η′ 11−βH 21−β4 )T
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Setting η = η′ we get an upper bound of
R21 +R22
η
+((1−α)(4α) α1−α η 1+α1−α H 21−α1 )T +((1−α′)(4α′) α′1−α′ η 1+α′1−α′ H 21−α′2 )T
+((1−β′)(4β′) β′1−β′ η 1+β′1−β′ H 21−β′3 )T +((1−β)(4β) β1−β η 1+β1−β H 21−β4 )T
≤ R21 +R22
η
+((1−α)(α) α1−α η 1+α1−α (2H1) 21−α )T +((1−α′)(α′) α′1−α′ η 1+α′1−α′ (2H2) 21−α′ )T
+((1−β′)(β′) β′1−β′ η 1+β′1−β′ (2H3) 21−β′ )T +((1−β)(β) β1−β η 1+β1−β (2H4) 21−β )T
≤ R21 +R22
η
+(η 1+α1−α (2H1) 21−α )T +(η 1+α′1−α′ (2H2) 21−α′ )T
+(η 1+β′1−β′ (2H3) 21−β′ )T +(η 1+β1−β (2H4) 21−β )T
≤ R21 +R22
η
+(2Hη) 1+γ1−γHT
Finally picking step size as η = (R21 +R22) 1−γ2 (2H)−1 (T2 ) γ−12 we conclude that
sup
x∈X φ(
1
T
T∑
t=1 ft ,x)− inff ∈F supx∈X φ( f ,x) ≤
4H(R21 +R22) 1+γ2
T
1+γ
2
(25)
Proof of Proposition 6. Let R1( f ) = ∑ni=1 f (i) ln f (i) and, respectively, R2(x) = ∑mi=1 x(i) lnx(i). These func-
tions are strongly convex with respect to ∥ ⋅ ∥1 norm on the respective flat simplex. We first upper bound regret
of Player I, writing ∇t as a generic observation vector, later to be chosen as Axt , and Mt as a generic predictable
sequence, later chosen to be Axt−1. Observe that ∥g ′t − gt∥1 ≤ 1/T 2. Let f ∗ = ei∗ be a vertex of the simplex. Then
⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩ = ⟨ ft − gt ,∇t −Mt ⟩+ ⟨ ft − gt ,Mt ⟩+ ⟨gt − f ∗,∇t ⟩
By the update rule,
⟨ ft − gt ,Mt ⟩ ≤ 1
ηt
(DR1(gt ,g ′t−1)−DR1(gt , ft )−DR1( ft ,g ′t−1))
and
⟨gt − f ∗,∇t ⟩≤ 1
ηt
(DR1( f ∗,g ′t−1)−DR1( f ∗,gt)−DR1(gt ,g ′t−1)) .
We conclude that ⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩ is upper bounded by
∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥ ft − gt∥+ 1ηt (DR1(gt ,g ′t−1)−DR1(gt , ft )−DR1( ft ,g ′t−1))
+ 1
ηt
(DR1( f ∗,g ′t−1)−DR1( f ∗,gt )−DR1(gt ,g ′t−1)))
= ∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥ ft − gt∥+ 1ηt (DR1( f ∗,g ′t−1)−DR1( f ∗,gt )−DR1(gt , ft )−DR1( ft ,g ′t−1))
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Using strong convexity, the term involving the four divergences can be further upper bounded by
1
ηt
(DR1( f ∗,g ′t−1)−DR1( f ∗,gt)− 12 ∥gt − ft ∥2 − 12 ∥g ′t−1 − ft ∥2)
= 1
ηt
(DR1( f ∗,g ′t−1)−DR1( f ∗,g ′t)− 12 ∥gt − ft ∥2 − 12 ∥g ′t−1 − ft ∥2)
+ 1
ηt
(DR1( f ∗,g ′t )−DR1( f ∗,gt))
= 1
ηt
(DR1( f ∗,g ′t−1)−DR1( f ∗,g ′t)− 12 ∥gt − ft ∥2 − 12 ∥g ′t−1 − ft ∥2)+ 1ηt ln
gt(i∗)
g ′t(i∗)
where f ∗ is 1 on coordinate i∗ and 0 everywhere else, and the norm is the ℓ1 norm. Now let us bound the last
term. First, whenever g ′t(i∗) ≥ gt(i∗) the term is negative. Since g ′t(i∗) = (1−1/T 2)gt(i∗)+1/(nT 2) this happens
whenever gt(i∗) ≤ 1/n. On the other hand, for gt(i∗) > 1/n we can bound
ln
gt(i∗)
g ′t(i∗) = ln
gt(i∗)(1−1/T 2)gt(i∗)+1/(nT 2) ≤
2
T 2
.
Using the above in the bound on ⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩ and summing over t = 1, . . . ,T , and using the fact that the step size
are non-increasing, we conclude that
T∑
t=1⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩≤ η−11 DR1( f ∗,g0)+
T∑
t=2DR1( f ∗,g ′t−1)(
1
ηt
− 1
ηt−1 )+
T∑
t=1∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥
− T∑
t=1
1
2ηt
(∥gt − ft ∥2+∥g ′t−1− ft ∥2)+ 2
T 2
T∑
t=1
1
ηt
≤ (η−11 +η−1T )R21,max+ T∑
t=1∥∇t −Mt ∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥−
1
2
T∑
t=1η
−1
t (∥gt − ft ∥2+∥g ′t−1 − ft ∥2)
+ 2
T 2
T∑
t=1
1
ηt
. (26)
where R21,max is an upper bound on the largest KL divergence between f
∗ and any g ′ that has all coordinates at
least 1/(nT 2). Since f ∗ is a vertex of the flat simplex, we may take R21,max ≜ log(nT 2). Also note that 1/ηt ≤ c√T
and so 2
T 2 ∑Tt=1 1ηt ≤ cT 1/2 ≤ 1 for T large enough. Hence we conclude that a bound on regret of Player I is given by
T∑
t=1⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩ ≤ (η−11 +η−1T )R21,max+
T∑
t=1∥Axt − Axt−1∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥−
1
2
T∑
t=1η
−1
t (∥g ′t − ft ∥2+∥g ′t−1− ft ∥2)+1 (27)
Observe that
ηt =min
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
R21,max
√∑t−1i=1 ∥Axi − Axi−1∥2∗−
√∑t−2i=1 ∥Axi − Axi−1∥2∗∥Axt−1 − Axt−2∥2∗ ,
1
11
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
and
11 ≤ η−1t ≤max{2R−21,max√∑t−1i=1 ∥Axi − Axi−1∥2∗,11}
With this, the upper bound on Player I’s unnormalized regret is
1+22R21,max +2
¿ÁÁÀT−1∑
t=1 ∥Axt − Axt−1∥
2∗+ T∑
t=1∥Axt − Axt−1∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥−
11
2
T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2+∥g ′t−1− ft ∥2)
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Adding the regret of the second player who uses step size η′t , the overall bound on the suboptimality, as in
Eq. (6), is
2+22R21,max +2
¿ÁÁÀT−1∑
t=1 ∥Axt − Axt−1∥
2∗+ T∑
t=1∥Axt − Axt−1∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥
+22R22,max +2
¿ÁÁÀT−1∑
t=1 ∥ f Tt A− f Tt−1A∥
2∗+ T∑
t=1∥ f Tt A− f Tt−1A∥∗ ∥yt − xt ∥
− 11
2
T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2+∥g ′t−1 − ft ∥2)− 11
2
T∑
t=1(∥yt − xt ∥
2+∥y ′t−1 − xt ∥2)
By over-bounding with
√
c ≤ c +1 for c ≥ 0, we obtain an upper bound
T∑
t=1⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩ ≤ 6+22R21,max +2
T−1∑
t=1 ∥Axt − Axt−1∥
2∗+ T∑
t=1∥Axt − Axt−1∥∗ ∥g ′t − ft ∥
+22R22,max +2T−1∑
t=1 ∥ f Tt A− f Tt−1A∥
2∗+
T∑
t=1∥ f Tt A− f Tt−1A∥∗ ∥y ′t − xt ∥
− 11
2
T∑
t=1(∥g ′t − ft ∥
2 +∥g ′t−1− ft ∥2)− 11
2
T∑
t=1(∥y ′t − xt ∥
2+∥y ′t−1 − xt ∥2)
≤ 6+22R21,max + 5
2
T∑
t=1∥Axt − Axt−1∥
2∗+ 12
T∑
t=1∥gt − ft ∥
2
+22R22,max + 5
2
T∑
t=1∥ f Tt A− f Tt−1A∥
2∗ + 12
T∑
t=1∥yt − xt ∥
2
− 11
2
T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2 +∥g ′t−1− ft ∥2)− 11
2
T∑
t=1(∥yt − xt ∥
2+∥y ′t−1 − xt ∥2)
Since each entry of the matrix is bounded by 1,
∥Axt − Axt−1∥2∗ ≤ ∥xt − xt−1∥2 ≤ 2∥xt − y ′t−1∥2 +2∥xt−1 − y ′t−1∥2
and similar inequality holds for the other player too. This leads to an upper bound of
6+22R21,max +22R22,max + 1
2
T∑
t=1∥yt − xt ∥
2+ 1
2
T∑
t=1∥gt − ft ∥
2
+5 T∑
t=1(∥g ′t − ft ∥
2+∥g ′t−1 − ft ∥2)+5 T∑
t=1(∥y ′t − xt ∥
2+∥y ′t−1 − xt ∥2)
− 11
2
T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2+∥g ′t−1− ft ∥2)− 11
2
T∑
t=1(∥yt − xt ∥
2+∥y ′t−1 − xt ∥2)
≤ 6+22R21,max +22R22,max
+5 T∑
t=1(∥g ′t − ft ∥
2−∥gt − ft ∥2)+5 T∑
t=1(∥y ′t − xt ∥
2−∥yt − xt ∥2) . (28)
Now note that
∥g ′t − ft ∥2−∥gt − ft ∥2 = (∥g ′t − ft ∥+∥gt − ft ∥)(∥g ′t − ft ∥−∥gt − ft ∥)
≤ (∥g ′t − ft ∥+∥gt − ft ∥)(∥g ′t − g ′t∥) ≤ 4
T 2
(29)
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Similarly we also have that ∥y ′t − xt ∥2 −∥yt − xt ∥2 ≤ 4T 2 . Using these in Eq. (28) we conclude that the overall bound
on the suboptimality is
6+22R21,max +22R22,max + 40
T
= 6+22log(nT 2)+22log(mT 2)+ 40
T
= 6+22log(nmT 4)+ 40
T
.
This proves the result for the case when both players adhere to the prescribed algorithm. Now, consider the
case when Player I adheres, but we do not make any assumption about Player II. Then, from Eq. (27) and Eq. (3)
with ρ = ηt , the upper bound on,∑Tt=1 ⟨ ft − f ∗,∇t ⟩, the unnormalized regret of Player I’s is
(η−11 +η−1T )R21,max+1+ T∑
t=1∥Axt − Axt−1∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥−
1
2
T∑
t=1η
−1
t (∥gt − ft ∥2+∥g ′t−1 − ft ∥2)
≤ 22R21,max +1+2
¿ÁÁÀT−1∑
t=1 ∥Axt − Axt−1∥
2∗+ T∑
t=1∥Axt − Axt−1∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥−
1
2
T∑
t=1η
−1
t ∥gt − ft ∥2
≤ 22R21,max +1+2
¿ÁÁÀT−1∑
t=1 ∥Axt − Axt−1∥
2∗+ 12
T∑
t=1ηt+1 ∥Axt − Axt−1∥
2∗+ 12
T∑
t=1(η−1t+1 −η−1t )∥gt − ft ∥
2
.
Now, using the definition of the stepsize,
1
2
T∑
t=1ηt+1 ∥Axt − Axt−1∥
2∗ ≤ R
2
1,max
2
T∑
t=1
⎛
⎝
¿ÁÁÀ t∑
i=1∥Axi − Axi−1∥
2∗−
¿ÁÁÀt−1∑
i=1 ∥Axi − Axi−1∥
2∗⎞⎠
≤ R21,max
2
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
i=1∥Axi − Axi−1∥
2∗
while
1
2
T∑
t=1(η−1t+1 −η−1t )∥gt − ft ∥
2 ≤ 2 T∑
t=1(η−1t+1 −η−1t ) ≤ 4η−1T+1
Combining, we get an upper bound of
22R21,max +1+2
¿ÁÁÀT−1∑
t=1 ∥Axt − Axt−1∥
2∗+ R
2
1,max
2
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
i=1∥Axi − Axi−1∥
2∗
+4max⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩2R
−2
1,max
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
i=1∥Axi − Axi−1∥
2∗,11
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
≤ 22R21,max +45+10
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥Axt − Axt−1∥
2∗+ R
2
1,max
2
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
i=1∥Axi − Axi−1∥
2∗
≤ 22R21,max +45+ 20+R21,max
2
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥Axt − Axt−1∥
2∗
concluding the proof.
Proof of Lemma 7. We start with the observation that aˆt and a¯t−1 are unbiased estimates of Axt and Axt−1 re-
spectively. Thats is Eit−1 [aˆt ]= Axt and Eit−1 [a¯t−1] = Axt−1. Hence we have
E[ T∑
t=1 f
⊺
t Axt − inf
f ∈∆n
T∑
t=1 f
⊺Axt] ≤ E[ T∑
t=1⟨ ft , aˆt ⟩− inff ∈∆n
T∑
t=1⟨ f , aˆt ⟩]
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Using the same line of proof as the one used to arrive at Eq. (27) in Proposition 6, we get that the unnormalized
regret for Player I can be upper bounded as,
E[ T∑
t=1 f
⊺
t Axt − inf
f ∈∆n
T∑
t=1 f
⊺Axt]
≤ E[(η−11 +η−1T )R21,max+1+ T∑
t=1∥aˆt − a¯t−1∥∗ ∥gt − ft ∥−
1
2
T∑
t=1η
−1
t (∥gt − ft ∥2+∥g ′t−1− ft ∥2)]
≤ E[(η−11 +η−1T )R21,max+1+ T∑
t=1ηt+1 ∥aˆt − a¯t−1∥
2∗+ 14
T∑
t=1η
−1
t+1 ∥gt − ft ∥2
− 1
2
T∑
t=1η
−1
t (∥gt − ft ∥2+∥g ′t−1− ft ∥2)]
Since ∥gt − ft ∥2 ≤ 4, we upper bound the above by
E[(η−11 +η−1T )R21,max+1+ T∑
t=1ηt+1 ∥aˆt − a¯t−1∥
2∗+ T∑
t=1(η−1t+1 −η−1t )−
1
4
T∑
t=1η
−1
t (∥gt − ft ∥2+∥g ′t−1 − ft ∥2)]
≤ E[2R21,max(η−11 +η−1T )+1+ T∑
t=1ηt+1 ∥aˆt − a¯t−1∥
2∗− 14
T∑
t=1η
−1
t (∥gt − ft ∥2+∥g ′t−1− ft ∥2)]
Since
ηt =min
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
R1,max
√∑t−1i=1 ∥aˆi − a¯i−1∥2∗−
√∑t−2i=1 ∥aˆi − a¯i−1∥2∗∥aˆt−1− a¯t−2∥2∗ ,
1
28m R2,max
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
and
28mR2,max ≤ η−1t ≤max{2R−11,max√∑t−1i=1 ∥aˆi − a¯i−1∥2∗,28m R2,max}
the upper bound on Player I’s unnormalized regret is
E[ T∑
t=1 f
⊺
t Axt − inf
f ∈∆n
T∑
t=1 f
⊺Axt] ≤ 56mR2,maxR21,max+1+ 7
2
R1,max
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥aˆt − a¯t−1∥
2∗ (30)
−7mR2,max T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2+∥g ′t−1− ft ∥2)
Both players are honest : We first consider the case when both players play the prescribed algorithm. In this
case, a similar regret bound holds for Player II. Adding the regret of the second player who uses step size η′t , the
overall bound on the suboptimality, as in Eq. (6), is
2+56R1,maxR2,max (mR1,max+nR2,max)+ 7
2
R1,max
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥aˆt − a¯t−1∥
2∗+ 72R2,max
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥bˆt − b¯t−1∥
2∗
−7mR2,max T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2+∥g ′t−1− ft ∥2)−7nR1,max T∑
t=1(∥yt − xt ∥
2+∥y ′t−1 − xt ∥2)
Now note that
∥aˆt − a¯t−1∥∗ ≤ n2δ ∥uit−1∥∗ ∣r+t − r−t + r¯−t − r¯+t ∣ = n2δ ∥uit−1∥∗ ∣2δu⊺it−1 A(xt − xt−1)∣ ≤ n ∣A(xt − xt−1)∣≤ n ∥xt − xt−1∥
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Similarly we have ∥bˆt − b¯t−1∥∗ ≤m ∥ ft − ft−1∥. Hence using this, we can bound the sub-optimality as
2+56R1,maxR2,max (mR1,max+nR2,max)+ 7
2
nR1,max
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥xt − xt−1∥
2 + 7
2
mR2,max
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥ ft − ft−1∥
2
−7mR2,max T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2+∥g ′t−1 − ft ∥2)−7nR1,max T∑
t=1(∥yt − xt ∥
2 +∥y ′t−1 − xt ∥2)
Using the fact that
√
c2 ≤ c2+1 we further bound sub-optimality by
2+56R1,maxR2,max (mR1,max+nR2,max)+ 7
2
mR2,max+ 7
2
nR1,max + 7
2
nR1,max
T∑
t=1∥xt − xt−1∥
2
+ 7
2
mR2,max
T∑
t=1∥ ft − ft−1∥
2−7mR2,max T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2+∥g ′t−1− ft ∥2)
−7nR1,max T∑
t=1(∥yt − xt ∥
2 +∥y ′t−1 − xt ∥2)
Nownote that ∥xt − xt−1∥2 ≤ 2∥xt − y ′t−1∥2 +2∥xt−1 − y ′t−1∥2
and similarly ∥ ft − ft−1∥2 ≤ 2∥ ft − g ′t−1∥2 +2∥ ft−1 − g ′t−1∥2
Hence we can conclude that sub-optimality is bounded by
2+56R1,maxR2,max (mR1,max+nR2,max)+ 7
2
mR2,max+ 7
2
nR1,max
+7mR2,max T∑
t=1(∥g ′t − ft ∥
2 −∥gt − ft ∥2)+7nR1,max T∑
t=1(∥y ′t − xt ∥
2−∥yt − xt ∥2)
≤ 2+56R1,maxR2,max (mR1,max+nR2,max)+ 7
2
mR2,max+ 7
2
nR1,max
+28mR2,max T∑
t=1∥g ′t − gt∥+28nR1,max
T∑
t=1∥y ′t − yt ∥
≤ 2+56R1,maxR2,max (mR1,max+nR2,max)+ 7
2
mR2,max+ 7
2
nR1,max
+ 28(mR2,max +nR1,max)
T
Just as in the proof of Proposition 6 we have R1,max ≤√log(nT 2) and R2,max ≤√log(mT 2) and so overall we get
the bound on sub-optimality :
2+56√log(mT 2) log(nT 2)(m√log(nT 2)+n√log(mT 2))+ 7
2
m
√
log(mT 2)+ 7
2
n
√
log(nT 2)
+ 28(m
√
log(mT 2)+n√log(nT 2))
T
Player II deviates from algorithm : Now let us consider the case when the Player 2 deviates from the prescribed
algorithm. In this case, note that starting from Eq. (30) and simply dropping the negative termwe get,
E[ T∑
t=1 f
⊺
t Axt − inf
f ∈∆n
T∑
t=1 f
⊺Axt]≤ 56mR2,maxR21,max+1+ 7
2
R1,max
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥aˆt − a¯t−1∥
2∗
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As we noted earlier, ∥aˆt − a¯t−1∥∗ ≤ n ∥xt − xt−1∥ and so,
E[ T∑
t=1 f
⊺
t Axt − inf
f ∈∆n
T∑
t=1 f
⊺Axt] ≤ 56mR2,maxR21,max +1+ 7
2
nR1,max
¿ÁÁÀ T∑
t=1∥xt − xt−1∥
2
Further noting that R1,max ≤√log(nT ) and R2,max ≤√log(mT )we conclude that
E[ T∑
t=1 f
⊺
t Axt − inf
f ∈∆n
T∑
t=1 f
⊺Axt] ≤ 56m√log(mT ) log(nT )+1+ 7
2
n
¿ÁÁÀlog(nT ) T∑
t=1∥xt − xt−1∥
2
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 8. Noting that the constraints are all H-strongly smooth and that the objective is linear for the
maximizing player, we can apply Lemma 4 to the optimization problem with R1(⋅) = 12 ∥⋅∥22 and R2 the entropy
function to obtain that
T (max
i∈[d]Gi ( f¯T )− inff ∈Fmaxi∈[d]Gi ( f ))
≤ ∥ f ∗− g0∥22
η
+ T∑
t=1⟨
d∑
i=1 xt (i)∇Gi( ft)−
d∑
i=1 yt−1(i)∇Gi(gt−1),gt − ft⟩−
1
2η
T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2
2+∥gt−1 − ft ∥22)
+ logd
η′ + β2
T∑
t=1∥G( ft )−G(gt−1)∥
2∞+ 12β
T∑
t=1∥yt − xt ∥
2
1− 12η′
T∑
t=1(∥yt − xt ∥
2
1+∥yt−1 − xt ∥21)
(Strictly speaking we have used a version of Lemma 4 where the first term coming from (12) in Lemma 1 is kept as
a linear term.) Here, G( f ) is the vector of the values of the constraints for f . We then write
T∑
t=1⟨
d∑
i=1 xt (i)∇Gi( ft)−
d∑
i=1 yt−1(i)∇Gi(gt−1),gt − ft⟩
= T∑
t=1⟨
d∑
i=1 xt (i)∇Gi( ft )−
d∑
i=1 yt−1(i)∇Gi( ft),gt − ft⟩+
T∑
t=1⟨
d∑
i=1 yt−1(i)∇Gi( ft )−
d∑
i=1 yt−1(i)∇Gi(gt−1),gt − ft⟩
= T∑
t=1
d∑
i=1(xt (i)− yt−1(i))⟨∇Gi( ft ),gt − ft ⟩+
T∑
t=1
d∑
i=1 yt−1(i)⟨∇Gi ( ft )−∇Gi (gt−1),gt − ft ⟩
≤ T∑
t=1∥xt − yt−1∥1maxi∈[d] ∣⟨∇Gi( ft ),gt − ft ⟩∣+
T∑
t=1
d∑
i=1 yt−1(i)∥∇Gi ( ft )−∇Gi(gt−1)∥2 ∥gt − ft ∥2
≤ T∑
t=1∥xt − yt−1∥1 ∥gt − ft ∥2+H
T∑
t=1∥ft − gt−1∥2 ∥gt − ft ∥2
where we used the fact that each ∥∇Gi ( f )∥ ≤ 1. Combining, we get an upper bound of
∥ f ∗ − g0∥22
η
+ T∑
t=1∥xt − yt−1∥1 ∥gt − ft ∥2−
1
2η
T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2
2+∥gt−1 − ft ∥22)+H T∑
t=1∥ ft − gt−1∥2 ∥gt − ft ∥2
+ logd
η′ + β2
T∑
t=1∥G( ft )−G(gt−1)∥
2∞+ 12β
T∑
t=1∥yt − xt ∥
2
1− 12η′
T∑
t=1(∥yt − xt ∥
2
1 +∥yt−1 − xt ∥21)
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≤ ∥ f ∗− g0∥22
η
+ 1
2β
T∑
t=1∥xt − yt−1∥
2
1+ β2
T∑
t=1∥gt − ft ∥
2
2− 12η
T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2
2+∥gt−1− ft ∥22)
+ logd
η′ + β2
T∑
t=1∥ ft − gt−1∥
2
2+ 12β
T∑
t=1∥yt − xt ∥
2
1 − 12η′
T∑
t=1(∥yt − xt ∥
2
1+∥yt−1 − xt ∥21)
+ H
2
T∑
t=1∥ ft − gt−1∥
2
2+ H2
T∑
t=1∥gt − ft ∥
2
2
= ∥ f ∗− g0∥22
η
+ 1
2
(β+H − 1
η
) T∑
t=1(∥gt − ft ∥
2
2 +∥gt−1− ft ∥22)
+ logd
η′ + 12 ( 1β − 1η′ )
T∑
t=1(∥yt − xt ∥
2
1+∥yt−1 − xt ∥21)
Picking β ≥ 0 such that 1
η
−H ≥β ≥ η′ we get an upper bound of
∥ f ∗− g0∥22
η
+ logd
η′ ≤ B
2
η
+ logd
η′
Of course, for this choice to be possible we need to pick η and η′ such that 1
η
−H ≥ η′. Therefore, picking η′ = 1
η
−H
and η ≤ 1/H we obtain
max
i∈[d]Gi ( f¯T )− inff ∈Fmaxi∈[d]Gi ( f ) ≤
1
T
inf
η≤H−1{
B2
η
+ η logd
1−ηH }
Now since T is such that T ≥ 1
ǫ
infη≤H−1 {B2η + η logd1−ηH }we can conclude that
max
i∈[d]Gi( f¯T )−argminf ∈F maxi∈[d]Gi( f ) ≤ ǫ
Observe that for an optimal solution f ∗ ∈ G to the original optimization problem (10) we have that f ∗ ∈F and∀i ,Gi( f ∗) ≤ 1. Thus,
max
i∈[d] Gi ( f¯T ) ≤ 1+ǫ
We conclude that f¯T ∈F is a solution that attains the optimum value F∗ and almost satisfies the constraints. Now
we have from the lemma statement that f0 ∈ G is such that c⊺ f0 ≥ 0 and for every i ∈ [d], Gi ( f0) ≤ 1−γ. Hence by
convexity ofGi , we have that for every i ∈ [d],
Gi (α f0 +(1−α) f¯T )≤αGi ( f0)+(1−α)Gi ( f¯T ) ≤α(1−γ)+(1−α)(1+ǫ) ≤ 1
Thus for α = ǫ
ǫ+γ and fˆT = (1−α) f¯T +α f0 we can conclude that fˆT ∈ G and that all the constraints are satisfied. That
is for every i ∈ [d],Gi( fˆT ) ≤ 1. Also note that
c⊺ fˆT = (1−α)c⊺ f¯T +αc⊺ f0 = (1−α)F∗ = γF∗
ǫ+γ
and, hence, fˆT is an approximate maximizer, that is
c⊺( f ∗− fˆT ) ≤ F∗− γF∗
ǫ+γ = F
∗ǫ+F∗γ−γF∗
ǫ+γ = ǫ( F
∗
ǫ+γ) ≤ ǫγF∗
Thus we obtain a (1+ ǫ
γ
)-optimal solution in the multiplicative sense which concludes the proof.
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Proof of Corollary 9. As mentioned, for both players, the time to perform each step of the optimistic mirror de-
scent in the Max Flow problem isO(d). Now further note that Max Flow is a linear programming problem and so
we are ready to apply Lemma 8. Specifically for f0 we use the 0 flow which is in G (though not inF ) and note that
for f0 we have that γ = 1. Applying Lemma 8 we get that number of iterations T we need to reach an ǫ approximate
solution is given by
T ≤ 1
ǫ
inf
η≤H−1{
B2
η
+ η logd
1−ηH }
Nowwe can use g0 = argmin
g∈F ∥g∥2 which can be computed inO(d) time. Observe that ∥ f ∗− g0∥2 ≤ ∥ f ∗∥2+∥g0∥2 ≤
2
√
d =∶ B . Also note that for linear constraints we have H = 0. Hence, the number of iterations is at most
T ≤ 1
ǫ
inf
η
{B2
η
+η logd} =
√
d logd
ǫ
Since each iteration has time complexityO(d), the overall complexity of the algorithm is given by
O(d3/2
√
logd
ǫ
)
this concludes the proof.
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